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Abstract 
Asset quality is a key indicator of sound banking. However, it is difficult for banking regulators 
and investors to assess it in the absence of a common, cross-border scheme to classify assets. 
Currently no standard is applied universally to categorise loans, the most sizeable asset on banks’ 
balance sheets. As a corollary, definitions of nonperforming loans (NPLs), despite recent steps 
towards greater harmonisation, continue to vary between jurisdictions. This paper offers a 
comprehensive analysis of NPLs and considers variations in the treatment of NPLs across 
countries, accounting regimes, and firms. The paper relies on a multi-disciplinary perspective and 
addresses legal, accounting, economic and strategic aspects of loan loss provisioning (LLP) and 
NPLs. A harmonised approach to NPL recognition is particularly desirable, in view of the fact that 
IFRS 9, the new accounting standard on loan loss provisioning, will be mandatory from January 
2018. IFRS 9 changes the relationship between NPLs and provisions, by relying on greater 
judgement to determine provisions. The potential for divergence makes the need for comparable 
indicators against which to assess asset quality all the greater. 
JEL: G01, G21, K20, M41. 
Keywords: Non-performing loans, asset quality, IFRS 9, impairment, loan loss provisions, bank 
capital, data standards, credit risk. 
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1. Introduction 
On 16 November 2015, the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a joint statement following review of their economic 
assistance programme to Cyprus. In this statement, the three institutions noted that “reducing the 
excessive levels of NPLs [non-performing loans] remains the number one priority”1 for economic 
recovery in the country.  
       The story of the financial crisis in Cyprus, and indeed of recent financial crises across the 
globe, is one that can be told through the trajectory of NPLs. Table 1 presents data from the World 
Bank on the ratio of gross NPLs as a percentage of gross total loans (hereafter the NPL ratio) in 
various countries.2 For reasons we discuss in detail below, these and any data on NPLs should be 
treated with caution because reporting countries compile these figures using different 
methodologies and definitions, and these also change over time.3 With that caveat in mind, the data 
in Table 1 nevertheless indicate the direction of travel, the path of NPLs across countries and time 
that show the salience of NPLs to the wider economy.4 
Beginning in 2007-09, with US banks having devoted about three quarters of their total loan 
portfolios to real estate lending (peaking at about $14.8 trillion in 2008 Q2), the largest percentage 
of NPLs came from this category of loans. In particular, large US bank holding companies with 
greater than $500 billion of assets witnessed their asset quality deteriorate through their direct 
holdings of real estate loans, and through exposure to residential mortgage backed securities 
(RMBS), and credit derivatives based on them.5 These assets also provided the channels for cross-
border contagion.6,8 Over the course of the crisis, Western European banks suffered large losses 
from impaired US RMBS.7 While those American and Western European banks with exposure to 
US RMBS experienced considerable asset quality deterioration during the initial phases of the 
Great Financial Crisis (GFC),8 NPL figures are now trending downward.   
By contrast, some countries on the periphery of the Eurozone along with Cyprus continue to 
experience highly elevated double digit NPL ratios well into 2016, and those in Central Europe 
and the Baltics have ratios that are high but considerably below 10% by this period. 9  
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Table 1 
Non-Performing Loan Ratios in Selected Countries 
 
 
Sources: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS/countries). Some values are missing in 
the World Bank Tables. 
New York Fed (http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/QuarterlyTrends2013Q2.pdf). 
Ratio of bank NPLs to total gross loans is the value of NPLs (gross value of the loan as recorded on the balance sheet) 
expressed as a percentage of the total value of the loan portfolio (including NPLs before the deduction of loan loss 
provisions). US BHS >$500bn is the number of US Bank Holding Companies with assets greater than $500 billion 
according to the New York Fed. 
 
 
NPLs are thus a recurring feature of economic and banking crises. As NPLs rise, so do funding 
costs for banks with bad loans on their books. These costs are often then passed onto firms and 
households, potentially slowing economic growth as credit contracts.10 Transparency around NPLs 
is therefore key to enabling banks and their regulators to understand where risk might be building 
up on balance sheets, and when higher provisioning or capitalisation is required. This in turn might 
lower the probability of bank crises, or at least dampen their impact. When crises do occur, clear 
identification of NPLs enables swifter policy responses. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Europe and the Baltics 9.5 7 3.9 3.7 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.8 6.4 10 12.3 13.8 11.6 8.2 5.8 4.8
Cyprus 3.6 4.5 5.8 10 18.4 38.6 45.4 47.7
Denmark 0.5 0.7 1.7 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.2 3.3 4.1 3.7 6 4.6 4.5 3.8
Euro area 3.7 2.9 3 2.5 2.3 1.8 1.3 1.8 2.8 4.8 5.4 6 8.1 7.9 6.8 5.3 4.4
European Union 4.6 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2 1.8 2.2 2.8 4.7 5.4 6.0 7.5 6.4 5.6 5.5 4.8
Eurozone Periphery (GIIPS) 4.9 3.3 3.7 3.6 4.1 3.2 2.9 2.9 3.8 6.6 8 11 16.3 22.1 18.7 17.4
Finland 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
France 5 4.1 5 4.8 4.2 3.5 3 2.7 2.8 4 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.2 4.0
Germany 4.7 4.6 5 5.2 4.9 4.1 3.4 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.2 3 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.0
Greece 12.3 5.6 7.4 7 7 6.3 5.4 4.6 4.7 7 9.1 14.4 23.3 31.9 34.3 36.6 36.3
Iceland 1.5 1.2 2.6 2.1 0.9 1.1 0.8 14.1 18.3 11.6 6.3 4.3
Ireland 1 1 1 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.9 9.8 13 16.1 25 25.7 20.6 14.9
Italy 7.8 6.7 6.5 6.7 6.6 7 6.6 5.8 6.3 9.4 10 11.7 13.7 16.5 18.0 18.1 17.1
Luxembourg 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2
Netherlands 1.8 2.3 2.4 2 1.5 1.2 0.8 1.7 3.2 2.8 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.5
Norway 1.2 1.3 2 1.6 1 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3
OECD members 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.6 2 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.9 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.4 2.7
Portugal 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2 1.5 1.3 2.8 3.6 4.8 5.2 7.5 9.8 10.6 11.9 12.0
Spain 1.2 1.2 1.1 1 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 2.8 4.1 4.7 6 7.5 9.4 8.5 6.2 5.6
Sweden 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.9 1.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.0
Switzerland 4.1 2.3 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.9 1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8
United Kingdom 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 1.9 1 0.9 0.9 1.6 3.5 4 4 3.6 3.1 1.7 1.0
United States 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.4 3 5 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.5 1.9 1.5 1.3
US BHS >$500bn# 1.2 1.4 2 1.9 1.4 1.3 1 1 3 7.2 6.7 5.5 5.3 4.5
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However, while regulatory bank capital and other claims on banks are increasingly comparable 
internationally,11 progress has been slower on standardising the asset side of the balance sheet, 
especially with respect to loan classification. As a result, material divergences still exist in NPL 
definitions across jurisdictions, although the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s 2017 
Guidelines in this area12 contain a suggested definition and constitute a welcome development. 
However, the Guidelines – soft law recommendations – are not binding and it is not clear yet which 
jurisdictions are looking to implement them and by when.  
This paper is divided into five sections, following this Introduction. Section 2 examines the 
existing divergence in the definition of NPLs and considers the coherence and reliability of NPL 
data. At a general level, an NPL is a loan where a borrower is considered unlikely to make 
repayments in accordance with contractual obligations. In many jurisdictions and for many firms, 
an NPL is defined as a sum of borrowed money upon which the debtor has not made his or her 
scheduled payments for at least 90 days. However, beyond this simple understanding of what 
constitutes an NPL, there is heterogeneity across jurisdictions and among global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs), as we document further in appendix B. These differences complicate 
cross-country and cross-firm comparisons, and make accurate aggregation challenging, if not 
impossible.13  
In section 3 we look at how accounting standards assess loan quality. NPLs are not an 
accounting concept. Instead the relevant accounting concept is ‘impaired loans.’14 Loans are 
impaired when accounting rules require loan loss provisions (LLPs) to be made, representing the 
fact that the amount expected to be repaid falls below the contracted value carried on a bank’s 
balance sheet. Following the 2007-09 financial crisis, calls were made for a single set of global 
accounting standards that ensure earlier recognition of loss. In response, IFRS provisioning rules 
have been changed15 such that provisions are raised earlier on banks’ balance sheets, so the amount 
of provision held at any point in time is higher. However, international consistency has not been 
achieved, and the new forward-looking provisioning frameworks inevitably requires a greater level 
of estimation by banks in calculating provisions, making diversity in impairment recognition more 
likely and thus potentially making banks’ financial statements less comparable.  
Section 4 examines the strategic choices and trade-offs banks will need to make under the new 
IFRS 9 provisioning rules. While IFRS 9 encourages early recognition of NPLs and adequate 
provisioning, several factors may inhibit banks from doing so. In particular, banks may have an 
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incentive not to draw attention to NPLs in order to avoid scrutiny as to the level of LLPs raised 
against them. LLPs are often described as a bookkeeping entry for expected losses, while equity 
is often described as a residual buffer for creditors from unexpected losses.16 In a crisis, however, 
losses from LLPs can reduce shareholders’ equity required to cover unexpected losses, and below 
the regulatory minimum required of banks in order to operate. While higher ex-ante provisioning 
against expected loan losses when the external environment is relatively benign lowers bank 
profitability in the short term, over the long term it may maintain the buffer needed against 
unexpected losses and reduce the need to raise equity during or after a crisis when it is more 
difficult to do so. Following Borio et al,17 and Laeven and Majnoni,18,66 who have argued that loan 
loss provisioning needs to be an integral component of banking regulation, we raise these issues 
because forward-looking provisioning is discussed less often than bank capitalisation in the 
scholarly literature on financial stability, though both issues are now prominent items on the post-
crisis regulatory agenda.  
We conclude in Section 5 by encouraging further work by policymakers to build on the 
progress made to date in standardising definitions and develop further criteria around how asset 
quality in banks is understood, both as an end in itself and to promote better understanding of loan 
loss provisions given the change in accounting standards. 
 
2. Divergences in defining NPLs across regulatory jurisdictions 
In this section we discuss the regulatory and accounting treatment of NPLs before and after the 
global financial crisis. We find divergences in how regulators and firms define and calculate NPLs.  
2.1. Regulatory treatment before the GFC 
Research conducted by Barisitz19,20 gives an overview of the general drivers behind differences 
in the definition of NPLs across jurisdictions. He finds that though a majority of countries classify 
loans as non-performing when principal or interest is 90 days or more past due and/or there is 
“well-defined weakness of loan or borrower”,20 there are two issues which complicate 
comparability. First, the notion of “well-defined weakness” remains unspecified within and across 
jurisdictions. Different firms and regulators have different data and different interpretations of the 
data used to estimate obligors’ ability to repay, and its deterioration. Second, there are other 
dimensions besides time since last repayment that matter in some jurisdictions. These include 
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whether collateral, guarantees, or other forms of security are factored into the credit classification 
process; whether the full outstanding value or only part of a loan is reported as non-performing; 
and how to treat restructured loans. Qualitative factors are also relevant. Even if repayments are 
made on time, a loan can go into default if the borrower breaches a contractual covenant, for 
example, by exceeding a maximum leverage threshold specified in the loan contract. 
In CESEE countries there has been divergence depending on whether they take a ‘product’ or 
‘customer’ view when determining if loans are performing or not. At stake is the following: 
suppose an obligor has two or more loans from the same credit institution. If the obligor falls 
behind repayment on one loan but is repaying on the other, there is debate about whether the 
performing loan should also be classified as non-performing, i.e. adopting a ‘customer’ view, since 
the delinquency on one loan implies that the obligor’s overall financial state has deteriorated. 
The table in appendix A provides examples of loan and credit classifications based on public 
information from financial supervisory and regulatory authorities in the Group of Twenty (G20). 
Like Barisitz, we find convergence around the global statistical definition of NPLs established by 
the UN System of National Accounts, and followed by all countries adhering to IMF or European 
reporting standards, namely: “a loan is non-performing when payments of interest or principal are 
past due by 90 days or more, or interest payments equal to 90 days or more have been capitalized, 
refinanced, or delayed by agreement, or payments are less than 90 days overdue, but there are other 
good reasons (such as a debtor filing for bankruptcy) to doubt that payments will be made in 
full”.21 However, no two definitions in our table are exactly alike. Loan quality classification 
schemes range from three to nine categories in some jurisdictions. Furthermore, like the UN 
statistical definition, which comes with the proviso that it “is to be interpreted flexibly,” the 
drafting of these definitions leaves scope for discretion by individual firms because the meaning 
of phrases like “other good reasons” are not precisely defined.  
     The table in appendix B presents extracts from the annual reports of financial institutions 
identified as Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs).22 While there is convergence towards 
the definition of an NPL as being loans 90 days or more past due, there are also differences along 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions.23 Quantitatively, the threshold for NPLs range from 60 to 
270 days, depending in part on the financial product. Several banks, for example, defer classifying 
first lien, residential mortgages as NPLs for some time after 90 days since last repayment. The 
same is sometimes the case where the loans are to government or government-backed entities. 
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Credit cards are also sometimes treated differently. Qualitatively, the detail of the definitions, and 
their substance, also show variety. For example, some firms take into account the status of the 
counterparty, particularly whether they have been declared bankrupt. Also, some firms explicitly 
address loan restructuring and concessions to borrowers, while in other instances the issue of loan 
restructuring, and, by extension, forbearance is not addressed. Another question to consider is that 
of whether or not a loan should be exempt from ‘non-performing’ status if the value of underlying 
collateral is sufficient to make good any shortfalls, even where there is poor performance of the 
underlying loan. Divergence in these issues makes the comparability of cross-firm, cross-
jurisdictional NPL figures difficult. 
 
2.2 Regulatory treatment after the GFC 
Asset quality is often at the root of many financial crises, and the recent GFC  is no exception. 
Bad lending decisions – subprime mortgages and others –and inadequate regulatory treatment of 
loans were central to the crisis plot both in the USA and in Europe. However, up until the start of 
the crisis, regulators focused on the measurement and adequacy of capital, while the asset side 
remained the ‘Cinderella’ of the bank’s balance sheet.  After the GFC, attention is naturally turning 
towards the issues of loan classification and NPLs to approach balance sheets holistically and to 
establish cross-border comparability. 
NPLs constitute an economic concept and any definition that seeks to identify that subset of 
loans necessarily contains an element of judgement. It follows that it is not possible to expect full 
uniformity in the identification of NPLs. As with much of banking regulation, a compromise is 
needed between the desire for consistency (and therefore rules) on the one hand, and economic 
relevance (and therefore discretion) on the other. But it is not true to say that, in the absence of full 
uniformity, there is nothing that policymakers can do to harmonise NPL definitions to enable better 
identification of problem loans and greater comparability across banks and jurisdictions. Indeed, 
in the wake of the GFC, there is a renewed push to develop an internationally harmonised approach 
to NPLs.  
       The genesis of the current efforts can be traced back to some of the earlier work done by the 
Basel Committee mostly in the context of capital regulation. The Basel II capital framework, 
published by the Basel Committee in 2004, introduced a system of credit risk calibration based on 
banks’ own internal risk models. The Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) methodology allowed firms to 
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provide their own estimates of probability of default, loss given default and exposure at default. In 
the context of this Basel II framework a definition of default was established.24,25  
In 2006 the Basel Committee issued guidance that specifically mentioned loan classification.26 
It recommended that banks should have a credit classification system on the basis of credit risk 
though stopped short of spelling out a classification scheme.27 While some bodies, such as the 
Institute of International Finance have established such schema (Table 2), these are not regulatory 
standards (soft law recommendations) but industry initiatives. And the Institute of International 
Finance’s system, while admirable, does not establish thresholds when loans should fall into the 
various categories but rather proposes a set of universal categories. These limitations 
notwithstanding, the IIF scheme provides a useful classification. 
 
Table 2  
Institute of International Finance loan classification scheme 
Loan Category Definition 
Standard Credit is sound and all principal and interest payments are current. Repayment 
difficulties are not foreseen under current circumstances and full repayment is 
expected. 
Watch Asset subject to conditions that, if left uncorrected, could raise concerns about full 
repayment. These require more than normal attention by credit officers. 
Substandard Full repayment is in doubt due to inadequate protection (e.g., obligor net worth or 
collateral) and/or interest or principal or both are more than 90 days overdue. These 
assets show underlying, well defined weaknesses that could lead to probable loss if 
not corrected and risk becoming impaired assets. 
Doubtful Assets for which collection/liquidation in full is determined by bank management 
to be improbable due to current conditions and/or interest or principal or both are 
overdue more than 180 days. Assets in this category are considered impaired, but 
are not yet considered total losses because some pending factors may strengthen the 
asset’s quality (merger, new financing, or capital injection). 
Loss An asset is downgraded to loss when management considers the facility to be 
virtually uncollectible and/or principal or interest or both are overdue more than one 
year. 
Source: Krueger (2002).28 
 
In the EU context, from a legal perspective, the publication in 2014 by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) of technical standards for the reporting of non-performing loans and forbearance 
is of great relevance.29 The EBA document provides the definition of “exposure”, “non-performing 
exposures” and “forborne exposures.”30 The EBA standard centres the definition of non-
performing on the notion of either 90 days past due, or where the debtor is assessed as unlikely to 
pay its credit obligations in full without realisation of collateral. Further disaggregated reporting 
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is required for forborne assets, and those defined as performing but nonetheless past due by 30 or 
60 days.  
The European Central Bank (ECB) published draft guidance31 in September 2016 on non-
performing loans that build on the EBA criteria, including consideration of how the ‘unlikely to 
pay’ criterion should be applied in practice, and how banks should manage and monitor 
forbearance, write-offs and collateral valuation.32 This is significant since with the advent of 
banking union, the ECB – the institution at the centre of the Single Supervisory Mechanism – is 
in charge of the supervision of significant credit institutions.   
     The issue of the prudential treatment of problem assets was also the subject of Guidelines issued 
by the Basel Committee in April 2017.33,34,37,38,39 This is the first time that a global standard-setter34 
issued rules (soft law) which, though not binding, and are intended to be observed and to 
complement the existing accounting and regulatory framework in relation to asset categorisation, 
aiming to arrive at a common definition of the terms ‘non-performing loan’ and ‘forbearance.’ The 
definitions apply to all credit exposures from on-balance sheet loans, debt securities, and other 
items due, and off-balance sheet items, such as loan commitments and financial guarantees.  
    The definition of non-performing according to these April 2017 Basel Guidelines combines 
three existing concepts. Firstly, all exposures defined as in default under the Basel definition 
quoted above are considered non-performing. Secondly, exposures determined to be credit- 
impaired for accounting purposes are defined as non-performing – this equates to ‘stage 3’ of the 
IFRS 9 provisioning model.35 Thirdly, loans that are past due by 90 days or where it is determined 
that full repayment is unlikely36 are also deemed non-performing. The BCBS clarifies that 
collateralisation does not influence past due status and that it should not be considered in the 
categorisation of non-performing exposures.37 In addition, forbearance occurs where a bank’s 
counterparty is experiencing financial difficultly, and “a bank grants a concession that it would not 
otherwise consider, whether or not the concession is at the discretion of the bank and/or the 
counterparty”.38 ‘Forbearance’ for this purpose includes concessions extended to any exposures in 
the form of a loan, a debt security or an off-balance-sheet item due to the position of the 
counterparty. Forbearance may be granted on performing or non-performing exposures.39 
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3. Accounting for NPLs 
Having discussed the regulatory dimension of NPLs including recent efforts aimed at 
achieving a greater degree of convergence, we move now to the accounting field. In principle, one 
might have been expected that the meaning of non-performing loans would be reasonably well 
defined by accounting bodies. However, neither the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) nor the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) address the topic of non-
performing loans as such. Rather, they deal with ‘impaired loans’ and note disclosures on credit 
risk.40 Moreover, the accounting frameworks governing the impairment of loans are not globally 
harmonised, and recent developments in accounting standard-setting might result in further 
divergence, particularly between the US and IFRS jurisdictions.41 To place the assessment of NPLs 
in the accounting context and to shed further light on banks’ practice, it is instructive to consider 
the nature of provisioning rules and the direction of their changes. These change substantially with 
the implementation of IFRS 9 from January 2018.  
 
3.1. Accounting treatment before the GFC 
On the eve of the financial crisis, both the IFRS and the US GAAP accounting standards that 
governed42 impairment of financial assets operated under a model known as ‘incurred loss.’ This 
meant that impairment was only recognised when a loss event had occurred. Within IFRS, the 
standard IAS 39 specifies that “losses expected as a result of future events, no matter how likely, 
are not recognised.” Although not reflected in the wording of the standard, this was in many cases 
interpreted as meaning that actual arrears had to take place before provisioning was allowed. Either 
a loan was determined to be impaired (individually or at the portfolio level), hence requiring a 
provision;43 or, there was no impairment charge for the loan(s) in question. 
One area where this ‘black-and-white approach’ to impairment has been suspected of giving 
an incomplete picture of the health of the financial system is the restructuring of troubled loans.44 
While IAS 39 is clear that restructuring is a ‘credit event’ that might lead to impairment, and 
impairments have to be calculated based on the difference between the original and modified 
conditions, the standard does not rule out of the possibility that restructuring might not involve 
impairment and therefore there is ambiguity about whether a loan that has been restructured should 
forever be identified as impaired. Consequently, lenders can choose to extend or otherwise modify 
the terms of loans that show evidence of financial stress. These loans might avoid arrears and as 
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such might not be identified as impaired (or non-performing), despite underlying credit 
deterioration of the borrower. If terms were modified, there would be no means of distinguishing 
problem loans from the general pool of performing loans since neither arrears nor impairment 
provisions were booked under IAS 39. The existence of large-scale avoidance of arrears through 
forbearance (sometimes known as “extend and pretend”) therefore might be invisible to regulators, 
investors, and other users of financial statements. Indeed, in the past, forbearance sometimes has 
been a key cause of financial crises, for example, during the so-called ‘Tequila crisis’ in Mexico.45 
In the US, whilst the notion of ‘incurred loss’ also formed the basis of accounting standards, 
the exact wording of the accounting literature differed to that used under IFRS, and there was 
traditionally a greater degree of regulatory intervention in accounting compared to many IFRS 
jurisdictions. The result was that provisions of US banks were often higher than those for banks 
reporting under IFRS. As well as taking charges for impairment provisions, US banks place certain 
loans in ‘non-accrual’ status, and no interest income is recognised for loans designated in this way. 
This latter practice is not shared by banks in IFRS jurisdictions.46 
Before the GFC information on asset quality could be discerned through notes to the accounts 
prepared by banks. For example, under IFRS, firms were required to disclose credit quality 
information on those financial assets that were not past due; analysis of assets that were past due 
but not impaired, showing how far in arrears they were; and a further analysis of those that were 
determined to be impaired. Whilst this meant that the extent to which provisions covered loans 
that were past due was disclosed consistently, the nature of the disclosure of non-impaired loans 
was left up to the reporting firm, as long as certain higher-level disclosure principles were met.  
For assets that were neither past due nor impaired, the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) preferred an approach that gave more discretion to firms in determining credit 
quality, stating as the basis for its conclusion that “because this information will vary between 
entities, the Board decided not to specify a particular method for giving this information, but rather 
to allow each entity to devise a method that is appropriate to its circumstances.” As a result, banks’ 
disclosure practice has varied in this area. While some banks show asset quality tables based on 
internally determined probabilities of default, others take a more qualitative approach to bucketing 
loans into credit quality classes. The result was a significant focus on those loans that were either 
already past due or impaired, but little information in comparable form either on losses expected 
but not yet incurred, nor on asset quality more broadly. 
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One of the reasons that banks under IFRS had relatively few accounting or disclosure 
guidelines to follow when it came to loan quality assessment is that IFRS standards are not 
intended to be industry-specific. This has the advantage that accounting principles can remain 
consistent across industries. However, it also means that banks, whose principal business is that of 
creating and managing credit risk, may require more specific guidance than is available from 
universal accounting standards. In particular, the term ‘non-performing loan’ is specific to 
banking.47 
 
3.2. Accounting treatment after the GFC 
The period that immediately followed the GFC witnessed intense criticism of the ‘incurred 
loss’ model, and multiple initiatives in the area of loan loss provisioning and related disclosures, 
both from accounting standard-setters and from prudential regulators.48 Starting in 2009, the G20 
called for accounting standard-setters to “strengthen accounting recognition of loan-loss 
provisions by incorporating a broader range of credit information” (G20 Research Group 2009). 
In the same year, the newly-created Financial Stability Board (FSB)49 encouraged accounting 
standard-setters to agree standards that “will incorporate a broader range of available credit 
information than existing provisioning requirements, so as to recognise credit losses in loan 
portfolios at an earlier stage”.50 The FSB was thus explicit in preferring an ‘expected loss’ model 
of provisioning, rather than a retrospective incurred loss model. 
In a 2009 draft, the IASB presented a set of proposals intended as the basis for a new 
provisioning model. As part of this proposal, IASB defined for the first time the notion of ‘non-
performing’ as “the status of a financial asset that is more than 90 days past due or is considered 
uncollectible.” Whilst the ‘90 days’ threshold often had been used informally as a definition of 
‘non-performing’, and in the Basel definition of default, this was the first reference to this threshold 
in the international accounting literature.   
However, there has been disagreement between IASB and the US accounting standard-setter 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board, or FASB) over the exact nature of any new provisioning 
model. The IASB revised its proposals from the 2009 version and issued a final standard on 
provisioning, IFRS 9, in 2014. The FASB in turn issued its final standard in June 2016. Both the 
IASB and FASB models require provisions to be based on forward-looking expectations. This 
marks a clean conceptual break from the methodology of incurred loss. The IASB has also 
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jettisoned the classifications based on past due status that previously formed part of its disclosure 
framework. Unlike the 2009 draft, the term ‘non-performing’ does not appear in the new 
accounting standard. One reason for this may be that a definition of a set number of days past due 
is arguably less relevant in a standard where provisions are calculated on a forward-looking basis.51 
Under the IASB approach, the forward-looking provision is governed by a three-stage model. 
Loans where no significant increase in credit risk has (yet) occurred are deemed to be at ‘stage 1’, 
and a provision set at losses expected from events in the next 12 months is raised.52 However, 
where a ‘significant increase in credit risk’ (defined as an increase in the risk of default) is deemed 
to have occurred, the amount provided increases such that losses expected from events over the 
lifetime of a loan are provided against, and the loan moves to ‘stage 2.’ The move from a 12-month 
to a lifetime horizon raises, perhaps significantly, the amount of provision required. When the loan 
becomes credit-impaired, it moves to ‘stage 3’ and interest income is also recorded net of credit 
losses. Thus whereas the current loan loss provisioning model is inherently backward-looking, and 
requires banks to assess what events of loss have occurred to date, the new approach bases the 
amount of provision explicitly on expectations of future loss. The FASB approach does not use 
the three-stage method described above but rather requires provisioning based on current expected 
credit loss for all loans (i.e. without reference to a 12-month horizon). 
The introduction of forward-looking, and therefore earlier, recognition of provisions ought to 
mean that banks will hold higher provisions at the onset of a downturn, thus lowering their 
downside risk. It should also broaden the focus of policymakers, analysts and others on banks’ 
asset quality beyond a narrow focus on past due or impaired assets. However, the calculation of 
future expected loss (whether under the IASB or FASB approach) necessarily involves a high 
degree of judgement based on forward-looking information, which in turn may lead to greater 
divergence in practice than is the case under incurred loss. Discretion over bank loan loss 
provisioning can have beneficial or negative consequences depending specifically on how 
managers exploit that discretion.53 While management discretion to use loan loss provisions as a 
means to smooth profits is objectionable, better provisioning in anticipation of future deterioration 
is not.54 
The potential for banks to diverge significantly from each other in measuring provisions 
arguably makes the need for comparable indicators against which to assess asset quality all the 
greater. A further consequence of a provisioning model based on ‘expected’ rather than ‘incurred’ 
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loss criteria is that the relationship between NPLs (as the term is often currently understood) and 
provisions necessarily changes. As noted above, both NPL criteria and the definition of impaired 
loans are currently intended to capture loans that already display some evidence of deterioration, 
and are often past due by more than a set number of days.55 NPLs can therefore be thought of as 
roughly analogous to ‘stage 3’ of the IFRS 9 provisioning model. But in an ‘expected loss’ world, 
every loan carries some level of provision against it, whether or not deterioration in credit quality 
or a loss event has occurred. Since provisions are raised earlier, and against all loans, whether or 
not they are deemed ‘non-performing’, the total amount of provision increases. At the same time, 
it continues to be the case that, due to expected recoveries and proceeds from collateral liquidation, 
provisions need not be 100% of the carrying value of NPLs. Thus, whereas in an incurred loss 
world provisions can be thought of as a subset of NPLs, and the provision to NPL ratio is less than 
1, in an expected loss world the relationship is more complicated. Losses expected on NPLs will 
still be a subset of the total NPL exposure, assuming that cash or collateral recoveries mean that 
the total amount lent is not expected to be lost on these loans. But these provisions will be 
supplemented by further provisions on loans that are not yet in the NPL category, but for which 
provisions are also required. The difference between the expected and incurred loss approaches 
with respect to provisions for non-performing and other types of loans can be conceived 
graphically, as in figures 2 and 3.56 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Provisions in an incurred loss approach. 
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Figure 3. Provisions in an expected loss world. 
 
Although firms are required to disclose how they determine whether a significant increase in 
credit risk has occurred, the criteria used in internal classifications more generally are often not 
disclosed. As a result, users of financial statements may not be able to understand the full context 
in which a loan is classified or reclassified, or to what extent loans have not been determined to 
have undergone a significant increase in credit risk even where some deterioration has occurred. 
A more comprehensive classification of asset quality, showing how credit quality changes from 
one period to the next, would arguably provide further colour in understanding how the bank goes 
about applying expected loss in practice. 
 
4. Strategic trade-offs in provisioning for NPLs 
As IFRS 9 implementation begins, banks will face a complex set of strategic choices in 
deciding how to make provisioning. This section discusses some of these strategic choices,57  
which include trade-offs between regulatory capital and loan write-offs on the one hand, and loan 
loss provisions on the other. Other considerations include a bank’s business model, how they 
classify loans and the tax treatment of LLPs. 
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4.1. Regulatory capital 
Current regulatory capital requirements give banks strategic reasons for wanting to keep LLPs 
low. The Basel Committee’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) and Tier 1 capital adequacy ratios 
include common stock and retained earnings. Since higher LLPs are taken as losses in the period 
when they are recognised, they reduce retained earnings and hence the CET1 and Tier 1 capital 
ratios.58 This implies a trade-off between reporting higher Common Equity Tier 1 and Tier 1 capital 
ratios, on the one hand, and maintaining adequate LLPs, on the other.59 
Whilst LLPs reduce retained earnings in all cases, the interaction of loan loss provisions with 
regulatory capital is more complex, and strategic considerations for banks are likely to change on 
implementing forward-looking provisioning models. For example, banks under the Basel IRB 
approach for credit risk are required to make a deduction for a regulatory measure of expected loss 
(based on a 12-month loss in a downturn scenario) from capital. The amount of the deduction from 
capital is the difference between this measure of regulatory expected loss and the accounting 
provision. Thus, assuming the regulatory deduction is higher than the accounting provision, the 
regulatory measure acts as the binding constraint on capital. For portfolios where this is the case, 
accounting provision levels do not influence capital ratios. But if the provision is higher than the 
regulatory expected loss calculation (as is more likely to be the case under IFRS 9), a further 
deduction may be required to take account of the extra amount of provision. Banks in this position 
may be incentivised to keep the accounting provision below the amount of the regulatory measure 
and avoid a further deduction. 
In addition, some provisions in certain jurisdictions may qualify for an “add-back” to Tier 2, 
or a lower tier, of regulatory capital, subject to certain constraints.60-62 While there has been 
considerable debate as to whether the constraints in place on adding back provisions into capital 
will adversely affect banks from making timely and adequate forward provisions for losses,61 
limited research exists to confirm or deny this hypothesis. In a similar vein, there is limited 
evidence on whether the inclusion of a countercyclical capital buffer of up to 2.5% of risk weighted 
assets for selected banks under Basel III rules will lead these banks to lower loan loss provisions. 
Ng and Roychowdhury have argued that an increase in capital, especially in the form of “add 
backs” from LLPs, increases pro-cyclical lending.62 
In general, it is desirable for banks to have a level of provisioning commensurate with the 
initial expectations of recovery on loans and therefore the pricing of credit.63 If provisions across 
17 
 
entire portfolios exceed initial expectations of recovery, the scale of losses may be so large that 
they cannot be covered by income, bringing a bank’s capital below or close to the regulatory 
minima required. At that point, banks might have to recapitalise when they and the wider system 
are in crisis. Since provisions under IFRS 9 are forward-looking and reflect a bank’s expectations 
of the future, they are by nature more sensitive to changes in expectations, and therefore to the 
broader economic outlook. This in turn means that provisions can rise quickly in a downturn. 
However, crises are the worst possible moment for a bank to raise capital, as investors may be 
wary of subscribing new shares when profits are falling and general economic conditions are poor. 
As a general rule then, bank recapitalisation during a crisis is second best to higher LLPs before 
they occur. Conversely, delayed loan loss recognition and low LLPs during boom conditions 
exacerbate pro-cyclical lending.64 Further, delays in LLP recognition pre-crisis can lead banks to 
reduce lending during busts because further asset growth can increase their risk of insolvency. The 
resulting credit crunch can thereby amplify the severity of the downturn. In brief, insufficient LLPs 
ex ante manifest ex post as losses to bank equity and systemic crises. 
The 2007-09 GFC is a good example of how LLPs can be under-provisioned when the path of 
future NPLs differs from historical experience. For example, mortgage delinquencies and low 
recovery rates on repossessed houses from the 2007 house price fall in the US far exceeded any 
previous market downturns, so there was considerable under-provisioning for these losses.65 
 
Figure 1. Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) based on Expected Losses and Capital for Unexpected Losses: Ex 
Ante Pre 2007 (Solid Green Curve) and Ex Post 2007 (Dash Red Curve) Loan Loss Distributions. 
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Figure 1, based on the stylized framework of Laeven and Majnoni,66 compares an ex ante loan 
loss distribution function67 (solid green curve) for a bank, with the realized or ex post loss 
distribution function (dashed red curve) which has shifted considerably to the right under 
conditions of an extreme market downturn, as in the case of the period after 2007. The estimated 
expected losses for which provisioning is undertaken is given by OA in Figure 1. The amount of 
capital for unexpected losses is given as A-B. This is in keeping with models for economic capital 
based on estimates of deviations from the mean where capital to cover losses is calculated for a 
high 99 percentile confidence level of the tail of the loss distributions. In Figure 1, this has been 
marked by points B and B#. 
The rightward shift of the realized loss distribution implies that the bank now has to contend 
with a substantial recapitalization programme equal to B-B# in Figure 1 which arises from a direct 
underestimation of capital requirements. The amount A-A# is the post 2007 average value of NPLs 
which exceeds loan loss provisions and gives an estimate for the extent to which bank capital has 
been eroded as current income has to offset NPLs. 
In sum, banks have an incentive to manage provision levels so as to optimise regulatory capital. 
In a downturn, however, the risk increases that provisions are inadequate, and so that sudden catch-
up adjustments are required. Under an expected loss approach, provisions in a downturn may also 
rise due to a more pessimistic view of the future than had hitherto been the case. The adequacy of 
banks’ provisioning policies will likely be of continued concern to both micro and macro 
prudential policymakers. 
 
4.2. Write-offs 
Another trade-off exists between loan loss provisions and the level of write-offs. This follows 
from the accounting identity that the provisions at the end of one period are equal to provisions at 
the start of that period, plus or minus any additional provisions or write-backs, minus the effect of 
reductions in the portfolio (such as disposals of loans, or loans reaching maturity), minus write-
offs. A loan is written-off when the bank no longer expects the principal to be repaid. This results 
in both the loans and the provisions against them disappearing from the balance sheet. Since such 
problem loans tend to have higher provisions as a proportion of the gross amount of the loan, it 
follows that a bank electing to write off more of its highly-provisioned problem loans will show 
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lower provisions as a percentage of their gross loans than a bank with the same number of highly 
provisioned problem loans that elects not to write them off.  
However, the aggregate ratio of LLPs to gross loans or to NPLs is often used by credit rating 
agencies to assess the riskiness of banks. Other things being equal, a higher aggregate provisioning 
ratio makes banks appear less risky. Therefore, there is an incentive for banks not to write-off 
highly provisioned loans even if they should. For example, Jassaud and Kang claim that one reason 
why Italian banks have delayed writing-off NPLs is that these would lower their overall 
provisioning ratio and possibly lower their credit rating.68 Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, 
barriers to the resolution of problem loans such as legal or economic impediments to collateral 
realisation may also result in the inability or unwillingness of banks to write loans off in a timely 
manner. This too can result in a higher number of highly-provisioned loans remaining on these 
banks’ balance sheets. Yet, the persistence of NPLs on bank balance sheets is a key reason for 
delay in the recovery from the GFC.69 
 
4.3. Business models 
The level of LLPs on a bank’s balance sheet will be indicative of its level of expected credit 
losses. These in turn reflect a firm’s chosen business model. Some banks’ business models are 
riskier than others. At one end of the spectrum are conservative banks that seek to minimise credit 
risk, NPLs, and LLPs by only making loans whose principal and interest they expect will be fully 
repaid. In the not-so-distant past, prudent banking in the UK meant banks tried to minimise loan 
losses. While this behaviour had many advantages from a financial stability and systemic risk 
perspective, the disadvantage was that bank profits were lower than they might otherwise have 
been because loan origination levels were lower. As a corollary, loans were less available to 
borrowers.70 
By contrast, in recent decades, UK banks increased their risk appetite in pursuit of greater 
financial reward. As a result, they developed a greater tolerance for some level of credit risk, NPLs, 
and LLPs if they appear to be profitable. Nowadays banks weigh up the marginal revenue from 
loans against the marginal costs from provisions, impairments, and losses, and may make loans 
even if the amounts collected from borrowers are expected to be less than the amount promised to 
be repaid in the loan contract. The result is a riskier financial system but – in good times – also a 
more profitable and credit abundant one.71 
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4.4. Accounting classification 
Loan classification is related to the issue of banks’ business models. In the past, loans 
originated by banks were held to maturity and accordingly carried at book value subject to 
impairment tests. However, many banks now buy other banks’ loans, and sell and securitise their 
own. These loans are then shown at fair market value on the balance sheet. Although the economic 
effect of losses on loans is the same for banks, the actual accounting label they are given impacts 
where and when losses are reported in financial statements. Where loans are at fair value, the 
amount of loss that is charged to the income statement equals the market expectation of loss, 
including but not limited to credit loss,72 rather than an estimate of credit loss only made by the 
entity itself. Whilst IFRS 9, by removing the need for identification of ‘loss events’ in 
provisioning, bring provisions closer to the market view of credit loss, the difference between a 
bank’s own estimate of loss and that of the market can still be substantial. 
In an economic downturn, where markets become illiquid, pricing information becomes more 
scarce and market participants become more cautious, the market’s expectations might be more 
severe than the bank’s own expectations, resulting in greater losses. In brief, because business 
models vary across firms, including their intentions to buy, hold, or sell loans, so too will the 
valuation of loans and therefore their level of provisioning, even if two firms have exactly the same 
amount of loans on their books.73 
 
4.5. Tax treatment 
Another issue bearing on how NPLs are provisioned for is their tax treatment. The tax treatment 
of accounting provisions varies across jurisdictions. In some places, all accounting provisions are 
allowable for offset against taxable income. In others, only certain types of provision are allowable, 
usually in cases where a loss is more certain.74 Some tax authorities allow loan loss charges only 
when the underlying loan has been written off. The potential to realise a tax benefit provides an 
obvious incentive to prefer some means of loan loss recognition over others, or to recognise tax-
deductible losses in certain periods. If an immediate tax benefit is available from making 
provisions early, there may be some offset of the incentive to delay provisioning in order to 
preserve capital as discussed in section 4.1. 
Consider the following example. Accounting regimes require provisions to be deducted from 
earnings in the period when they are made. However, the fiscal authority may not recognise them 
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as a deductible expense at the same time, instead doing so when losses manifest. That means 
provisions may be added back to taxable income increasing the overall base on which the tax is 
applied. Banks will recognise a deferred tax asset. In a regime such as IFRS 9 where provisions 
are made earlier, these deferred tax assets might grow in value. However, if, for example, tax rates 
fall in the future, and the bank makes insufficient profit against which to claim the tax credit, or 
the bank moves its operations to a jurisdiction with a lower corporate tax rate, then the value of 
that deferred tax asset will be less than anticipated so that the actual amount of taxes the bank pays 
over time is more than if the provisions had been tax deductible in the first place.75 The extent to 
which tax considerations actually influence provisioning behaviour among firms is a topic worthy 
of further empirical research. The important point to bear in mind here is that there are tax 
implications that are factored into how firms go about loan loss provisioning, especially now with 
the dawn of IFRS 9.  
 
5. Conclusion 
NPLs and their under-provisioning pose a danger to economic and financial stability, 
especially in situations where the over-extension of lending has led to a banking crisis. The NPL 
situation facing some countries in Europe today is exemplary. Indeed, it bears more than a passing 
resemblance to past crises such as Latin America in the 1980s and Japan in the 1990s where 
protracted debt crises resulted in ‘lost decades’.76 
Ultimately it is poor lending, rather than accounting or reporting, that causes financial crises. 
However, the timely recognition of problem loans and credit loss by banks, and proper 
transparency so that asset positions are well-understood by the market, regulators and the general 
public, is critical to averting and mitigating crises. However, banks may variously calculate the 
accounting, regulatory and tax implications of NPLs and their provisioning differently. This can 
result in under-provisioning, particularly when the economic environment is relatively benign. But 
the early recognition of expected losses in good times is generally agreed by policymakers to 
contribute to greater bank resilience and mitigate the impact of crises on banks’ balance sheets. 
This in turn lowers the probability of downturns resulting in debt crises that last several years or 
even decades. 
Even before provisioning, problem loans need to be identified according to criteria that are 
transparent, understandable and economically meaningful. Recent initiatives by BCBS and EBA 
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are a step in the right direction. The introduction of expected loss provisioning methodologies that 
require loans to be classified into different categories amplifies the need for more understandable 
methods of asset and loan classification.  
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Appendix A 
Some loan and credit classifications across G20 countries. This list is not intended as exhaustive, but gives 
a flavour of supervisory practice and defined terms in different jurisdictions. 
 
Country and source NPLs/Impaired loans definition 
Argentina77 Commercial loans are classified as follows: (1) normal; (2) special follow-up; (3) 
substandard; (4) high insolvency risk; (5) unrecoverable; and (6) unrecoverable based on 
technical criteria. Special follow-up loans are divided into: a) under observation, include 
those debtors up to 90 days past due in situations that if not controlled or corrected in a 
timely manner, could compromise their repayment capacity; and b) those under 
negotiation or with refinancing agreements, which include debtors that although unable 
to pay their obligations under the agreed conditions, have declared their intention of 
refinancing their debts no later than 60 days after becoming past due. 
Australia78 A facility must be classified as impaired regardless of whether it is 90 days or more past 
due, when there is doubt as to whether the full amounts due, including interest and other 
payments due will be achieved in a timely manner. This is the case even if the full extent 
of the loss cannot be clearly determined. Such a requirement applies particularly to the 
range of flexible financing facilities common in the Australian financial system, including 
loans where repayment of principal and interest occurs only as a single payment at 
maturity. 
Brazil79 The Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) does not provide a formal definition of non-
performing loans. A proposed definition would include: (1) delinquent loans – more than 
90 days overdue; (2) other loans not overdue more than 90 days but classified by the 
lending bank as E, F, G or H, according to the regulatory risk classification; and (3) 
renegotiated loans. Risk classification requires lending banks to classify loans according 
to a 9-level classification scale (AA, A, B, C, D, E, F, G or H). According to the BCB’s 
Resolution 2.682, loans overdue must be classified on risk levels, as following: a) from 
15 to 30 days: at least risk level B; b) from 31 to 60 days: at least risk level C; c) from 61 
to 90 days: at least risk level D; d) from 91 to 120 days: at least risk level E; e) from 121 
to 150 days: at least risk level F; f) from 151 to 180 days: at least risk level G; g) more 
than 180 days: risk level H. 
Canada80 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions considers the below listed 
conditions to be indicative of non-performing status: (1) a payment on a deposit with a 
regulated financial institution or a restructured loan is contractually 90 days in arrears; (2) 
a payment on any other loan (excluding credit card loans) is contractually 90 days in 
arrears unless the loan is fully secured, the collection of the debt is in process and the 
collection efforts are reasonably expected to result in repayment of the debt or in restoring 
it to a current status within 180 days from the date a payment has become contractually 
in arrears; and (3) a payment on any loan is contractually 180 days in arrears.  
China81 According to the supervision rules, commercial banks classify their loans into five 
categories -- pass, special mention, substandard, doubtful and loss. Special mention loan 
means the borrower has ability to repay the loan currently but may be affected by some 
unfavorable factors. The last three categories of loans are referred to as NPLs. 
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France82 The national accounting framework provides the concept of ‘doubtful’, whose definition 
is similar but non identical to the ‘non-performing’ one as provided by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA). Loans are considered as doubtful when the debtor is 
considered as “unlikely to pay” or when 90-day past due amounts exist (for some types 
of exposure, the period could be longer, which explains why the definition of doubtful is 
similar but not identical to the EBA one). According to the credit risk and asset quality 
classification, impaired loans and past due are >90 days loans to total loans. 
  
Germany83 The German legal framework does not provide specific guidelines for NPL recognition 
and classification/write-off. The General Banking Act of Germany does not explicitly 
refer to performing/non-performing loans. NPLs refer to non-performing exposures 
(NPEs)—as defined by the EBA Implementing Technical Standards on supervisory 
reporting on forbearance and non-performing exposures (EBA ITS)—excluding debt 
securities. According to the IMF Country Report 16/189, loan classification and 
provisioning are considered as an accounting issue. The supervisors do not re-classify 
loans or request increased provisions and rely on capital add-on. For portfolios of credit 
exposures with homogeneous characteristics, the exposures are classified when payments 
are contractually in arrears for a minimum number of days (e.g., 30, 60, 90 days). 
India84 
 
Banks are required to classify non-performing assets (NPAs) further into the following 
three categories based on the period for which the asset has remained non-performing: (1) 
sub-standard assets; (2) doubtful assets; (3) loss assets. A sub-standard asset would be 
one, which has remained NPA for a period less than or equal to 12 months. An asset 
would be classified as doubtful if it has remained in the sub-standard category for a period 
of 12 months. A loss asset is one where loss has been identified by the bank or internal or 
external auditors or the Reserve Bank of India inspection but the amount has not been 
written off wholly.  A NPA is a loan where interest and/or instalment of principal remain 
overdue for a period of more than 90 days in respect of a term loan. According to the IMF 
Country Report No. 16/76, stressed loans include NPAs and restructured advances (i.e. 
loans that have been subject to stress and are thus more likely to turn into NPAs). 
 
 Indonesia
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NPLs are loans classified as substandard, doubtful and loss. Debtor has defaulted when: 
(a) there are arrears in principal and/or interest payments and/or other claims for 90 days 
although the Earning Assets (Bank fund provisions for gaining revenue, which are in the 
forms of credits, securities, interbank placements, acceptance claims, claims on securities 
purchased under resale agreements, derivative claims, equity participations and off 
balance sheet items) have not fallen due in the above mentioned categories; (b) payments 
on principal and/or interests and/or other claims have not been received at the time the 
Earning Assets fall due; and (c) other requirements aside from payments of principal 
and/or interest have not been met, which can cause event of default. 
Italy86 
 
According to Circular 272/08, the Bank of Italy adopted the following breakdown of 
NPLs: (1) past due/overdrawn exposures (past due by 90 days or more, with a further 
breakdown by days past due band); (2) unlikely to be paid exposures (with a further 
breakdown by days past due bands); and (3) bad loans (state of insolvency). When 
applicable, NPL forborne exposures are included in each of these categories. For 
performing exposures, the Bank of Italy has provided the following classification: 
performing; performing but past due by less than 90 days (1-30 days, 30-60 days, etc.); 
and performing forborne (with a distinction between one concession or more than one 
concession).With respect to forborne exposures, for regulatory purposes the Italian banks 
are required to follow the criteria defined by the EBA ITS. Also, Italian banks are legally 
required to comply with the EBA ITS regarding the definition/classification of NPEs. The 
Bank of Italy does not provide regulation concerning specific provisioning rules for 
NPLs, also in terms of how to treat the recovery time estimation. There are no specific 
national guidelines or rules for NPL write-off. 
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Japan87 
 
Loans are classified into four categories: (1) bankrupt or de facto bankrupt (“bankrupt or 
quasi-bankrupt”); (2) doubtful; (3) special attention (“needs attention” or “substandard”); 
and (4) normal. Bankrupt or de facto bankrupt loans are those extended “to debtors who 
are legally and formally bankrupt, i.e., in the process of liquidation, reorganization and 
rehabilitation, or virtually bankrupt with no prospects of resuscitation”. Doubtful loans 
are those extended “to debtors who have not gone bankrupt but are in financial difficulties, 
and thus whose lenders are unlikely to receive the principal and interest concerned on due 
dates”. Special attention loans are those “whose interest and/or principal payments are in 
arrears by 3 months or more, and restructured assets with changes in terms and 
conditions,” and the normal loans are “all loans to debtors who have no particular 
problems with their financial conditions” which are not classified as any of the first three 
categories. The total amount of NPLs is the sum of loans that are categorized as “bankrupt 
or de facto bankrupt,” “doubtful” and “special attention.”  
Republic of Korea88 
 
Under the asset classification rule, there are five classifications applicable to a bank loan: 
normal, precautionary, substandard, doubtful, and presumed loss. Loans classified as 
either substandard, doubtful, or presumed loss are collectively referred to as substandard 
or below loans (SBLs). The SBL classifications are influenced by forward-looking criteria 
(FLC), so a performing loan that currently generates interest income may be classified as 
an SBL if it is determined that the borrower’s debt-servicing ability has significantly 
deteriorated and has raised the risk of future default. In contrast, the primary determining 
factor an NPL classification is whether a loan currently generates interest payment, so a 
loan would not be classified as an NPL if it continues to generate interest income.  
Mexico89 
 
There is no formal definition of NPLs under Mexican legislation. Banco de México does 
not provide specific rules for NPLs classification. In order to reclassify the loan as non-
performing, 90 days must go by after the end of the extension period. The adjusted 
delinquency rate is the non-performing loan portfolio plus write-offs over the previous 
twelve months divided by total loan portfolio plus write-offs over the previous twelve 
months. 
Russia90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is no exact definition of “non-performing loan” under the Russian legal framework. 
The Bank of Russia shares an approach used in international practice, considering NPLs 
as loans with overdue debt over 90 days. The loans quality categories (probability of 
impairment of a loan) are classified on the basis of professional judgment using 
combination of two classification criteria (the borrower’s financial position and the debt 
service quality). Loans are classified (except for loans grouped in a portfolio of 
homogeneous loans) into one of five quality categories: (1) standard loans – no credit 
risk; (2) non-standard loans – moderate credit risk; (3) doubtful loans – considerable credit 
risk; (4) problem loans – high credit risk; and (5) loss loans – no possibility of loan 
repayment due to the borrower’s inability or refusal to meet loan commitments, which 
stipulates complete (100 per cent) impairment of the loan. Loans classified as non-
standard loans and loss loans are impaired.  
Saudi Arabia91 
 
Credit risk comprises the following loan classification: (1) impaired loans; (2) defaulted 
loans; (3) past due loans (less than 90 days, 90-100 days, 180-360 days, over 360 days); 
and (4) allowances (specific allowances and general allowances). While past due loan 
simply means a loan which has not been paid on time and is now overdue by certain days 
(which after 90 days falls in the definition of default).Non-performing loans are 
considered to be loans that are more than 90 days past due. 
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South Africa92 
 
According to the South African Reserve Bank, the loan should be classified as non-
performing in line with the bank’s credit and write-off policy. Loans which are in arrears 
(but not in default) and which are restructured should not be classified as performing until 
such time as the obligor’s ability to meet the requirements of the revised terms and 
conditions has been established. Credit risk exposures are classified as either “standard”, 
“special mention”, “substandard”, “doubtful” or “loss” by South African banks and 
reported on a quarterly basis. 
Turkey93 
 
The Regulation on Procedures and Principles for Determination of Qualifications of 
Loans and other Receivables by Banks and Provisions to be Set Aside (Article 5) requires 
banks to categorize loans and receivables under five groups. Loans categorized in “Group 
1- Standard” and “Group 2-Special mention” are performing loans. Loans classified in 
the remaining 3 categories are considered non-performing loans. Following are the 
criteria for those non-performing categories. Group 3- Limited recovery: past due 
between 91-180 days or limited recovery expectation due to financing and liquidity 
problems of the debtor. Group 4- Suspicious recovery (doubtful): past due between 181-
365 days or substantial deterioration in the creditworthiness of debtor but not considered 
loss because of the partial recovery expectation. Group 5- Loss: past due for over 365 
days or no recovery expectation due to the significant deterioration in the creditworthiness 
of the debtor. 
United Kingdom94 
 
NPLs are not formally defined at UK level for supervisory purposes. The EBA definition 
is used for regulatory reporting. The definition for forbearance should be taken from 
either: (1) the EBA consultation paper on Implementing Technical Standards on 
Supervisory Standards; and (2) the definition of forbearance as detailed in the guidance 
published by FSA (now FCA) in 2011.  
United States95 Non-performing loans include loans that are: (1) 90 days or more past due and still 
accruing; or (2) non-accrual (i.e., loans on which a bank has ceased to accrue interest).  
European Union96 
 
A loan is classified as a non-performing exposure where the loan is 90 days past-due or 
if there is a risk of unlikely repayment without realization of collateral. The definition 
applies regardless of the classification of a loan or debt security as impaired or defaulted, 
but a loan or a debt security that has been classified as impaired in the financial statements 
or that has been classified as defaulted in capital adequacy shall always be classified as a 
non-performing exposure according to EBA’s definition. This definition applies in 
parallel to the definitions reported in this table for those jurisdictions that are members of 
the European Union (France, Germany and Italy). 
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Appendix B 
Table: NPL Classification by Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) 
(Source 2014/2015 Financial Statements) 
 
For all GSIBs, 90 days past due is not a sufficient condition for a loan to be considered to be an NPL.  
Qualifications on the 90 days past due criterion for NPLs are given below. This information is primarily 
obtained from the 2014/2015 Financial Statements of the GSIBs. Column 1 gives the overriding criteria of 
NPL/impairment status which can include but may be independent of the 90 days past due criterion. The 
purpose of Column 2 is to ascertain if credit card loans and non-secured loans are treated differently from 
the general criteria used. Column 3 lists any exceptions to the treatment of Home Equity Loans. Column 4 
gives the cases when a non-accrual status is used97 with the latter needing specific material evidence for 
problems of non-payment. Here we note that ‘non-accrual’ is widely used in the US but does not exist as a 
concept under IFRS; hence US banks will have a yes in column (4) and typically non-US banks do not.  
‘No Disclosure’ (ND) is inserted when there is no specific information given in the Financial Statements 
of GSIBs and ‘Not Applicable’ (NA) where a practice (non-accrual of interest) is not permitted by the 
accounting framework used by the bank. 
 
Name of GSIBs 
(Source) 
Col (1) 
Internal system 
used showing 
degrees of 
credit 
deterioration?98 
 
Col (2) 
Separate 
criteria for 
credit card 
loans or other 
non-secured 
consumer 
loans? 
Col (3) 
Separate 
criteria for 
Home Equity 
Loans? 
 
Col (4) 
Separate ‘non-
accrual’ status?  
Col (5) 
Other criteria or 
exceptions to 
NPL status not 
given in Cols 1-4 
 
 
 
Agricultural Bank 
of China99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
NA 
 
 
ND 
 
Bank of America100 
 
 
 
 
 
Charged off 1 
month after 180 
days past due 
Junior Lien is 
considered 
NPL if first-
lien is 90 days 
due past, even 
if junior lien is 
performing 
 
 
Purchased credit –
impaired loan 
portfolios or loans 
accounted under 
fair value option 
excluded 
Name of GSIBs 
(Source) 
Col (1) 
Internal system 
used showing 
degrees of 
credit 
deterioration? 
Col (2) 
Separate 
criteria for 
credit card 
loans or other 
non-secured 
consumer 
loans? 
Col (3) 
Separate 
criteria for 
Home Equity 
Loans? 
 
Col (4) 
Separate ‘non-
accrual’ status? 
Col (5) 
Other criteria or 
exceptions to 
NPL status not 
given in Cols 1-4 
 
 
 
Bank of China101 
 
 
 
ND 
 
 
 
ND 
 
NA 
 
ND 
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Bank of New York 
Mellon102 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
At 270 (90) 
days past due 
all first 
(second) lien 
mortgages 
placed on non-
accrual 
 
 
 
 
 
ND 
Barclays103 
 
 
 
See Col 5 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
ND 
 
 
NA 
 
Past due 
determined by 
contract 
BBVA104 
 
 
As stipulated in 
Section II of 
Annexe IX of 
Bank of Spain 
Circular 04/2004 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
NA 
 
 
See Col 1 
BNP Paribas105 
 
 
When 1 loan to a 
debtor is deemed 
doubtful all 
other loans to 
the debtor 
classified 
similarly 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
 
See Col 5 
 
 
 
NA 
 
6 months due past 
rather than 3 
months for loans to 
real estate and 
local authorities 
Citigroup Inc.106 
 
 
 
 
NPL status at 
180 days due 
past 
 
ND  
Non-accrual status 
automatic at 90 days 
due past 
 
ND 
Credit Suisse107 
 
 
 
 
ND 
 
ND 
 
NA 
Subprime has NPL 
status at 120 days 
past due 
Name of GSIBs 
(Source) 
Col (1) 
Internal system 
used showing 
degrees of 
credit 
deterioration? 
 
Col (2) 
Separate 
criteria for 
credit card 
loans or other 
non-secured 
consumer 
loans? 
Col (3) 
Separate 
criteria for 
Home Equity 
Loans? 
Col (4) 
Separate ‘non-
accrual’ status? 
Col (5) 
Other criteria or 
exceptions to 
NPL status not 
given in Cols 1-4 
 
 
Deutsche Bank108 
 
 
 
 
ND 
 
 
ND 
 
 
NA 
 
 
ND 
Goldman Sachs109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ND 
 
 
 
ND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ND 
 
Groupe BPCE110 
 
As stipulated in 
French 
Accounting 
Standards 
Authority Reg. 
No. 2014-07 
 
 
 
 
ND 
 
 
 
ND 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
Col 1 status at 6 (9) 
months past due 
for real estate 
(local authorities) 
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Group 
CréditAgricole111 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
NA 
 
ND 
HSBC112 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
NA 
 
ND 
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank 
of China 
Limited113 
 
Overall most 
loans graded 
using these 
criteria 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
NA 
 
Uses 12 category 
internal 
classification for 
corporate loans 
Name of GSIBs 
(Source) 
 
 
 
Col (1) 
Internal system 
used showing 
degrees of 
credit 
deterioration? 
Col (2) 
Separate 
criteria for 
credit card 
loans or other 
non-secured 
consumer 
loans? 
Col (3) 
Separate 
criteria for 
Home Equity 
Loans? 
 
Col (4) 
Separate ‘non-
accrual’ status? 
Col (5) 
Other criteria or 
exceptions to 
NPL status not 
given in Cols 1-4 
 
 
ING Group114 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
NA 
 
 
ND 
JP Morgan Chase 
& Co.115 
 
 
 
 
 
Excluded from 
90 day past due 
unless Col 1 
applies 
 
30 day past 
due applies or 
as per contract 
 
 
 
Loans insured by 
US Govt. agencies 
excluded from 90 
days past due 
unless Col 1 
applies 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
FG116 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
ND 
 
 
 
 
ND 
 
Mizuho FG117 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
All impaired loans 
also designated as 
non-accrual 
 
Troubled debt 
restructuring uses 
ASC310 issued by 
US FASB 
 
Morgan Stanley118 
 
 
NPL at 90 days 
past due, or 
through other 
grading criteria 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ND 
 
Nordea119 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
NA 
 
 
ND 
30 
 
 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland120 
 
 
NPL classified 
as ‘risk’ element 
has 100% 
default 
probability 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
Concept of ‘accruing 
loans’ is used for 
classification but 
interest accrued 
under IFRS 
For collectively 
assessed loans, loss 
provisions not 
allocated to 
individual loans 
and entire portfolio 
can be classified as 
impaired 
Name of GSIBs 
(Source) 
Col (1) 
Internal system 
used showing 
degrees of 
credit 
deterioration? 
Col (2) 
Separate 
criteria for 
credit card 
loans or other 
non-secured 
consumer 
loans? 
Col (3) 
Separate 
criteria for 
Home Equity 
Loans? 
Col (4) 
Separate ‘non-
accrual’ status? 
Col (5) 
Other criteria or 
exceptions to 
NPL status not 
given in Cols 1-4 
Santander121 
 
 
Past due varies 
between 30 and 
90 days triggers 
NPL status 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
 
ND 
Société Générale122 
 
3 months past 
due for doubtful 
status and NPL 
status after 1 
year of this if 
loan not 
terminated 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
 
NA 
Six months (9 
months) past due 
for mortgages 
(local authority 
loans) with 
doubtful status 
Standard 
Chartered123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
NA 
 
Restructured loans 
excluded from 90 
day past due NPL 
status for which no 
default occurs for 
upto 180 days 
State Street124 
 
 
 
See Col 4 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
ND 
 
60 days 
past due non-
accruing loans have 
NPL status 
 
 
ND 
 
Sumitomo Mitsui 
FG125 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
ND 
 
 
No 
90 days past due 
loans given NPL 
status excludes 
so called ‘bankrupt 
loans’ in order to 
support borrowers’ 
recovery from 
financial 
difficulties 
 
UBS126 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
ND 
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Unicredit Group127 
  
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
NA 
 
ND 
 
 
 
Name of GSIBs 
(Source) 
Col (1) 
Internal system 
used showing 
degrees of 
credit 
deterioration? 
 
Col (2) 
Separate 
criteria for 
credit card 
loans or other 
non-secured 
consumer 
loans? 
Col (3) 
Separate 
criteria for 
Home Equity 
Loans? 
 
Col (4) 
Separate ‘non-
accrual’ status? 
Col (5) 
Other criteria or 
exceptions to 
NPL status not 
given in Cols 1-4 
 
 
 
 
Wells Fargo128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General criteria 
apply 
 
 
General 
criteria apply 
 
Loans have non-
accrual status if 
general criteria apply 
with Col 5 
exemptions 
120 days past due 
for real estate 1-4 
family and first and 
junior lien 
mortgages which 
are not mortgage 
loans and some 
consumer loans 
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